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ABSTRACT
International collaboration on 
aerospace projects has been a way of life 
in Europe for many years. The paper will 
deal with some of the reasons for this 
association in development and manufacture 
and describe some of the relevant manage­ 
ment organisations.
A brief review of the existing 
projects and their programmes will be made 
with particular emphasis on the MRCA pro­ 
gramme. This represents the present phase 
of work using the variable wing sweep 
principle/ research on which started in 
the late 1940's and included some Anglo- 
American co-operation via NASA. The 
variable sweep concept survived a series 
of national and international programme 
studies and political situations before 
reaching its present stage.
Europe is currently measuring its 
capability of remaining a first line 
source of aerospace equipment and some 
observations will be made with regard to 
the future in this respect.
INTRODUCTION
Europe today is a collection of 
sovereign states - (of which Great Britain 
is an off-shore island) - with a long 
tradition of resourcefulness, inventive­ 
ness and ingenuity in both the aesthetic 
and martial arts. The growth of the 
nation-state is a European phenomenon and 
it was from Europe that our ancestors set 
out to colonise the world - the principal 
driving-force being the quest for trade 
and gold.
Unless you have a captive market - 
which quite literally was often so in 
those days (slave-trade) - you have to 
offer something which your customer wants 
and more importantly cannot make, or 
obtain, for himself at a cheaper price. 
Since the new-found world was abundant with 
raw materials, the mother countries of 
Europe - led by Britain - were spurred 
into the development of technology some two 
centuries ago since when we have relied on 
our technical expertise in order to earn 
our living in the world. Coming now to 
more modern times it is interesting to re­
call that even in 1935 the British 
aircraft industry was twice the size of 
its US counterpart.
Although European inventiveness has 
shown the way in practically all technolo­ 
gical progress from the railway engine to 
the space rocket, we have generally been 
ill-poised to reap the rewards - partic­ 
ularly of our more recent endeavours - 
which have gone to the USA with its 
greater pre-occupation with production for 
a large domestic market.
The 'horse-less 1 carriage is an ex­ 
ample from an earlier era. Gottlieb 
Daimler, Lanchester, Turcat and other 
Europeans may have set the technical scene 
but it was Henry Ford who supplied the 
market.
In aeronautics too, Europe has often 
pioneered in technology (swept wing from 
Germany, jet propulsion, radar, VTOL etc) 
but we have failed to reap the reward by 
quantity production. The sharing of re­ 
sources, particularly financial, and ex­ 
tension of the market are the driving 
reasons for Aerospace collaborative 
partnerships.
EUROPE TODAY
Sharing work in Europe is not a 
recent innovation; in 1910 an Anglo-French 
project, the Zodiac, was shown at an ex­ 
hibition in Olympia, London and the 
Bristol Boxkite, which stemmed from a 
French Farman design was being produced at 
the rate of two per week. The Vickers 
No.l monoplane was designed in partnership 
with another Frenchman, M. Pelterie.
Figure 1 shows many current partner­ 
ships for airframe and helicopter manu­ 
facture, which have worked with varied, 
but in general, satisfactory degrees of 
success; these associations are not 
limited to European partners. Figure 2 
shows the similar situation which exists 
among the engine companies as there also 
does in missile and space activity. One 
interesting feature shown on these two 
networks is that manufacturers can be in 
collaboration on one project and in oppo­ 
sition on another. There are no formal 
associations for the long term continuity
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of Aerospace programmes, although Airbus 
Industrie is a move in this direction! 
other current associations could develop 
this way.
The number of employees in the major 
companies of the European industry are 
shown on Figure 3 which also compares 
three of these airframe companies with the 
large American companies. The comparison 
might suggest one reason why Europe is 
striving to get together in some manner to 
pool its resources, to match US competit­ 
ion. It also highlights a likely problem 
which we in the U.K. could be up against 
when negotiating with European partners, 
that of the relative sizes of our ind­ 
ustries. U.K. has the complete capability 
to "go it alone", but the capital re­ 
sources are not there to back the invest­ 
ment required, even if the political en­ 
vironment allowed.
Historically, Europe's share of 
world trade has been of the order of 30%, 
(Figure 4.) (10% BAG, 10% Fokker, 10% - 
other - Civil a/c). This trade excludes 
China, the Soviet Union and the United 
States own military market, the U.K. has 
consistently contributed about half of 
that of all Europe put together. It is the 
aim of any "United Europe" approach to 
Aerospace to keep or even improve on this 
performance, providing the world market 
and the opportunity are there.
A total involvement in all Aerospace 
activity is an essential in providing a 
balanced base. Guided Weapons, Space, 
Military Aircraft and Commercial Aircraft 
within one overall organisation allows for 
the peaks and valleys of each to be 
smoothed and for the fusion of the differ­ 
ent technologies across the board to be 
beneficial to each. However, to keep this 
paper within bounds, Military and 
Commercial aspects o^nly will be dealt with.
A collaborative military project 
usually has political as well as commerc­ 
ial overtones; as often as not the allo­ 
cation of work is controlled politically or 
strategically, rather than on a wholly 
commercial basis.
Collaboration in Europe, see Figure 
5, has so far included, such projects as the 
Transall, Breguet Atlantique, Jaguar, MRCA 
and Alpha Jet and has demonstrated a re­ 
markable degree of success in the com­ 
promise of each, country's own Operational 
requirements.
The advantage of European programmes 
for Military Aircraft stems from, the fact 
that Governments are the customers and that 
it is almost impossible to get an inter­ 
national programme going at all unless
there is a firm production commitment by 
each of the participating Governments; for 
example the Jaguar has a British/French 
commitment for 40O aircraft, over 200 of 
which have already been delivered to the 
two Air Forces. In addition Export pro­ 
duction is in hand for two other countries. 
The MRCA production requirements total 807 
aircraft, 385 for RAF, 322 for the German 
Air Force and 100 for the Italians. 
Export interest is already being shown.
None of these however resulted from 
a NATO specification, perhaps the nearest 
was the Breguet Atlantic sponsored by the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, 
France, Holland, U.S.A. and NATO; the two 
latter,did not take part in the manufact­ 
uring activity. The UK on this occasion 
chose the Nimrod to meet its own special 
requirements, for very good operational 
reasons but to the annoyance of the 
sponsoring countries.
About 1961-1962 NATO Basic Military 
Requirements Numbers 3 and 4 were issued 
to meet the need for a short take off and 
vertical landing tactical aircraft and for 
its support aircraft. Although participa­ 
tion in design and manufacture across 
national frontiers featured as a require­ 
ment, after a full scale competition, 
technical evaluation and a winner chosen, 
the project fell by the wayside, a triumph 
for Nationalism.
Defence budgets can and do alter 
these programmes and we are now in a 
period of stringent economy. It is im­ 
portant therefore that each participating 
country takes due cognizance of the re­ 
quirements of the broader market in 
arriving at its operational requirements, 
to make the product attractive to custom­ 
ers other than itself. Provided this is 
done sensibly it can be of benefit to the 
home customer by virtue of a cheaper 
product.
The longer production runs of 
collaborative projects leading to lower 
unit cost, contrasts sharply with some of 
the purely national projects which had 
been conducted on the "drip feed" or 
never-never basis, whereby successive 
stages of the programme were contracted 
for without there being any commitment 
whatever to the next stage.
For the production of Civil Aircraft, 
the attractions for International 
collaboration are quite different, the 
collaborating Governments feel unable to 
instruct their own national airlines to 
buy. There is no dramatic increase in the 
starting orders, as in the case with 
Military Aircraft. In fact there is no 
certainty that there will be any starting
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orders from the joining countries. Air­ 
lines, although they may be wholly or 
partly state owned, have to operate in a 
highly competitive environment and if they 
are not using equipment that is as good as 
their competitors can buy in the free 
market, they will lose their competitive 
edge - at least that's the airline view!
Fewer partnerships, Figure 6, have 
so far been established for Civil Aircraft 
but those that have, have so far demon­ 
strated that they can produce technically 
good aircraft. However, airlines have 
historically bought from a single manu­ 
facturer; consortium built aircraft are 
new to them and one of the big tasks has 
been to earn customer confidence in these 
consortia.
MANAGEMENT OF COLLABORATIVE PROJECTS
One essential feature of collabora­ 
tion is to get the difficult, but abso­ 
lutely necessary, matter of programme man­ 
agement right and this subject could well 
merit a paper on its own. A summary will 
suffice here.
Two basically different methods of 
organization for the projects that have 
been discussed have so far been tried. 
Concorde is controlled by a series of 
committees whose members include nationals 
of both participating countries and re­ 
sponsible to a joint national authority at 
ministerial level. Jaguar and MRCA are 
run by industrial companies set up in one 
or other of the participating countries 
acting under the laws of the 'host 1 
country and responsible to policy organ­ 
izations comprising members of the nations 
concerned. The policy organizations are 
responsible for providing the industrial 
companies with the necessary finance drawn 
in pre-determined ratios from each parti­ 
cipating nation's treasury according to 
the work-sharing agreement.
Figure 7 sets out the Concorde 
organization down to the industrial 
working level on the airframe side. The 
engine firms follow a similar pattern.
It is important to stress that there 
is no such thing as a French Concorde or a 
British Concorde. Two assembly lines 
exist, one in Toulouse, the other in 
Filton, but each Concorde is assembled 
from components and equipment 50 per cent 
of which are built and supplied by France 
and 50 per cent of which are built and 
supplied by U.K. Each aircraft is, there­ 
fore, a truly joint effort.
At no time has one man been establi­ 
shed as leading the Concorde Project. The
top man in each of the four industrial 
companies (two airframe, two engine) and 
the two Government Project Teams can be 
identified at any one time. But the 
Government Project Leaders are the serv­ 
ants of their respective Ministers so it 
can be said that eight people are in 
charge.
The Concorde organisation and mana­ 
gement is fully recorded in a book, 
'Organizing the Transnational 1 by 
Milton S. Hochmuth written under the aus­ 
pices of the Centre for International 
Affairs Harvard University. The author is 
obviously confounded by the technical 
success of a project in which in theory 
the management could not work.
Such an organisation is obviously 
not the best for quick decision making but 
the undoubted technical success of the 
project might quite well be attributed to 
the microscopic attention given to solving 
the many requirements and professional 
pride of the participants.
The Government organisation for 
Jaguar is shown on Figure 8 with the air- 
frame industrial company Societe Euro- 
peenne de Production de 1'Avion E. C.A.T. 
(SEPECAT). SEPECAT has no staff of its 
own but draws on the facilities of the 
parent companies. The company is 
registered in France under French contract 
law. RolIs-Royce/Turborneca is the comp­ 
any registered in England under British 
contract law to control the engine produc­ 
tion. Work sharing is, like Concorde, 
equally split between the two countries. 
The Jaguar programme is one of the most 
rapid of military aircraft programmes of 
modern times. In three years from defi­ 
nition to supersonic flight.
Jaguar was evolved as a result of 
two requirements, one in France and the 
other in the U.K., both being studied by 
the respective services and design teams 
in 1964. The formal agreement for a joint 
project was not signed until May, 1965 
when technical co-operation between 
Breguet and BAC started towards an agreed 
aircraft design.
At this time the two engine compan­ 
ies - Rolls-Royce and Turbomeca - also 
began their design collaboration. Pro­ 
totype manufacture did not start until 
October, 1966 and less than two years 
later, in September 1968, the first Jaguar 
built in two countries, but assembled in 
France, flew for the first time.
The MRCA is controlled by the 
British, German and Italian Governments, 
Figure 9, and the industrial companies 
Panavia (airframe) and Turbo-Union
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(engine) and Mauser IWKA (gun). Panavia, 
and Mauser are registered in Germany and 
Turbo-Union in England. Capital arrange­ 
ments are in the ratio BAC-42% per cent; 
Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm 42k per cent; 
Fiat - 15 per cent.
Panavia has a permanent staff, its 
members being seconded from BAG, MBB and 
Fiat, and draws on the facilities of those 
parent companies.
The Airbus Industrie organisation is 
shown on Figure 10. Airbus Industrie acts 
as main contractor for the whole program. 
The policy of Airbus Industrie is directed 
by a Supervisory Board which consists of 
members from Aerospatiale, CASA, Fokker, 
Deutsche Airbus and Hawker Siddeley. The 
policy decided upon by the Supervisory 
Board is effected by the Chief Executive 
and four Directors for Production, Techni­ 
cal Affairs and Co-ordination, Financial 
Affairs and Commercial Affairs; the latter 
means sales and after-sales activities. 
Airbus Industrie signs the contracts with 
its suppliers which are the companies AS, 
Hawker Siddeley, Fokker, General Electric 
and others, and it signs the sales agree­ 
ments with the airlines. Airbus Industrie 
is also responsible for training and for 
after-sales financing. ^Airbus Industrie 
is a Groupement d'lnteret Economique 
(G.I.E.) which is a particular company 
structure unique to French law.
The U.S. practice of prime contract­ 
or and sub-contractor is not presently 
suited to Europe - principally because of 
national pride I There are too many 
companies in existence and too few proj­ 
ects in prospect and Governments (rather 
than industrialists) need design leader­ 
ship to be vested in their own country 
from time to time in order to justify 
their voters 1 money.
In a developed Western democracy 
where the Defence Budget is always sub­ 
jected to close scrutiny - and rightly so - 
the situation is high-lighted in the 
military aircraft programmes. I need only 
mention in passing the abortive attempt to 
build the Anglo-French Variable Geometry 
Aircraft (AFVG) where one partner elected 
to go-it-alone. Nationalism dies hard in 
the military sphere but progress is being 
made and the recent EEC Action, Programme 
for the European Aeronautical Sector in­ 
cludes proposals for both military and 
civil aerospace which goes beyond inter­ 
governmental collaboration and points the 
way ahead, in Europe.
chart of some of the Organisations con­ 
cerned with the Aerospace future in 
Europe together with the countries who are 
members of these.
The Commission of the European 
Communities (EEC) - Action Programme for 
the European Aeronautical Sector, was the 
subject of a lecture in December, 1975 at 
the Royal Aeronautical Society in London 
by Christopher Layton.
The work of the report surveyed all 
of the aspects, motivations, market, 
financing methods, employment and product­ 
ivity, research and technological develop­ 
ment etc. leading toward proposing a 
common policy for the aircraft industry. 
Quoting from the Report:-
"If the Community's aircraft 
industry is to have any future, we must go 
beyond the stage of intergovernmental co­ 
operation between differing, and still 
national, aerospace policies.
To this end, sponsorship of the 
aircraft industry should be exercised by 
the Community" .
It goes on to enlarge on this by 
saying: -
"The Council would make the major 
policy decisions on programmes, financing 
and conduct consultations with users, 
producers, trade union and national 
authorities, to bring all large civil 
transport aircraft construction activities 
into a coherent programme, optimising the 
use of resources, to arrange a joint re­ 
search programme etc." There is a great 
deal of background in the document, it is 
a commendable and enthusiastic effort; 
enthusiasm and positive thinking is an 
important ingredient toward a prosperous 
future, but there must be doubt on time 
scale, time to reach agreements, more im­ 
portant to make decisions. This paper is 
not the proper medium to comment further.
N.A.T.O. - has 15 permanent members, but 
the Military Committee which makes re­ 
commendations on military matters is re­ 
presented by only 13 members. Iceland has 
no military forces and France withdrew 
from the military organisation in 1966.
The Western European Union - has seven 
members and was formed to provide for co­ 
ordination of defence policies and co­ 
operation in economic social and cultural 
matters.
WHERE NEXT
My next Figure (Figure 11) is a
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A.E.C.M.A. - the European Association of 
Aircraft Manufacturers is represented by 
the equivalent in 10 countries of our 
S.B.A.C. It also includes Eurospace as a 
member. The aims of AECMA and an 
appraisal of the prospects of the European 
Aerospace Industry is documented by a 
lecture by Mr. Greenwood/ President of 
AECMA and Chairman of B.A.C. given at the 
Royal Aeronautical Society in April, 1975.
The European Civil Aviation Conference - 
is an inter-governmental organisation 
which has the objective of promoting the 
co-ordination, the better utilization and 
the orderly development of European air 
transport.
The European Space Agency - was in May, 
1975 formed out of the earlier ELDO and 
ESRO organisations to promote co-operation 
in space research and technology for 
peaceful purposes.
Eurogroup - is a group of 10 countries 
intent on getting joint procurement and 
programme co-operation.
Each of these is, in some way or 
another, working toward improving the 
European member countries Aerospace bus­ 
iness; I wonder what the net effect of 
this effort might be.
For many years now governments and 
industry together, have produced a sit­ 
uation where Europe has collected a 30% 
share of the world trade, half of this 
from the U.K. alone. In Military Aircraft, 
this is largely the result of collabora­ 
tive projects. On the civil side, from 
successful uni-lateral products, Caravelle, 
B.A.C. 1-11, Trident and F-28. Whatever 
else happens, nothing must put a brake on 
the smooth running and the industrial 
implications of these. Ideally, the aim 
of these European organisations should be 
to develop on this process and help to­ 
ward removing some of their imperfections.
We have some successful military 
aircraft programmes going well now and the 
Air Staffs of some of the European count­ 
ries have already gone a long way in dis­ 
cussion toward the writing of OR f s suit­ 
able for their joint use and for the wider 
market? hopefully this will lead to the 
next big purchase from European rather 
than from U.S. sources.
European Airlines have historically 
bought mainly from U.S. sources, (Figure 
12) but encouragement to buy from Euro­ 
pean manufacturers will only be as a re­ 
sult of there being available in Europe 
equipment to meet their requirement, at 
the right time and for the right price. 
Six companies in three countries and the
national airlines of these countries, 
British Airways, Air France and Lufthansa 
are currently working together toward 
achieving this aim.
The Group of Six Activity started on 
2nd September, 1974 following an Inter- 
Company Agreement between SNIAS, BAG, 
Dornier, H.S.A., MBB and VFW/Fokker. 
Following a Joint Communication to the 
three interested Governments of 18th 
November, 1974 the Principals of the Six 
Companies agreed to establish an Executive 
Board to supervise an Exploratory Phase 
to October, 1975.
This activity is not an aeroplane 
project it is a study group to seek and 
define an opportunity - if there is one - 
and to determine the requirements to meet 
such an opportunity.
Its guidelines were to undertake 
discussions with the three National Air­ 
lines, B.A., A.F. and Lufthansa regarding 
their joint requirements for future short 
medium haul requirements (E.A.O.R. f s) and 
study the market in other airlines 
throughout the world. To examine the 
prospects of meeting these requirements 
from European resources with particular 
emphasis on derivatives of existing air­ 
craft and where not possible to examine 
the prospects for a new design. To assess 
overall efficiency, including manufactur­ 
ing productivity and consider what im­ 
provements could be effected and examine 
what types of organisation might be used.
Conclusions reached in this phase of 
the work show that:-
Current European aircraft provide a 
sound base for development.
Europe has a proven technological 
capability, but its competitive position 
must be improved.
The world market indicates en­ 
couraging prospects to the end of the 
century.
The conclusions also state reserva­ 
tions over the credibility of collaborat­ 
ive arrangements and points to the 
urgency in agreeing a joint policy.
The objective of the next stage of 
the investigations is to make definitive 
recommendations on a joint European 
product policy by mid 1976.
Over the years B.A.C., Fokker, 
H.S.A. and S.N.I.A.S. have demonstrated 
their ability to penetrate the markets of 
the world (Figure 13). Hopefully, the 
organisations just referred to will help
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to improve the percentage of European 
aircraft in European fleets*
So far I have not really mentioned 
Concorde. It is a technically excellent 
aircraft, free from competition, outside of 
the USSR but it is inconceivable that it 
will go all that long without United 
States competition it is a key aircraft of 
any European family and 'must be part of 
any long term plan. A supersonic trans­ 
port long term future is I believe inevit­ 
able! but I think dependent on broader 
collaboration than European alone, colla­ 
boration also with American partners.
I have deliberately refrained from 
writing much about European Companies 
joining American Companies as an alter­ 
native to, or part of, developing the 
European Industry; the subject of the 
paper being European collaboration. In 
looking toward the future however Europe 
must not close its eyes to the fact that 
this alternative exists? .American 
associations and their consequences must 
be studied and considered. We are fully 
aware of U.S., competitive ability, we 
don't know as much as we should about the 
rules for working together which would 
satisfy us and be to the benefit of both 
parties. Taking in sub-contract work from 
this area - if available - for example 
would help us to understand each other 
better and could lead to more permanent 
associations. Some collaborative work 
with U.S.A. but which must include a de­ 
gree of design responsibility could 
supply some of the bricks for developing 
European Aerospace. Getting our house in 
order toward a strong European industry is 
an important feature in any future broader 
International collaboration to the benefit 
of all parties concerned.
Aerospace requires such enormous 
resources, that the large projects such 
as supersonic transport and space trans­ 
port, i.e. space shuttle, - lead almost 
inevitably to broader sharing of work. 
For Europe even to decide which areas it 
should work in or which it should avoid, a 
close liaison understanding with the U.S. 
would be of great value to both sides. 
That engineers on both sides of the 
Atlantic can work together successfully 
and with respect for each other was borne 
out when a British Aircraft Corporation 
team worked with the North American 
Rockwell team in 1970-71.
Military Aircraft requirements are 
different, for example, the requirements 
which met the need of Vietnam would not 
have suited the environment in Europe, but 
even here certain arrangements across the 
water are sensible. U.S.A. for instance 
bought Harrier.
Because of necessary Government in­ 
volvement political pressures cannot be 
avoided but as a matter of principle 
collaborative projects should not be 
undertaken for reasons of political con­ 
venience. Each project must be viable in 
the conditions in which it is being built, 
but ideally also be capable of satisfying 
the broader requirements and capable of 
achieving a worthwhile share of the world 
market. Collaborative projects must also 
be undertaken for the benefit of all 
parties concerned.
Possibly the best way toward a 
future prosperous European Industry is to 
build up on our existing collaborative 
partnerships towards more permanent 
bodies; with governments, through their 
various agencies, assisting by writing 
specifications more acceptable across the 
board and suitable for world wide markets. 
Provided that commercially competitive 
civil aircraft can be built in Europe, 
governments should encourage their 
national airlines to look more generously 
to this market. There appears to be a 
clear need to move toward broader inter­ 
national collaboration particularly in the 
very high resource absorbing projects, 
particularly space and the supersonic 
transport.
Modern facilities of transport and 
communications makes distance no longer a 
barrier or inconvenience in arranging 
partnerships and Aerospace has played the 
major part in reaching this state. It is 
almost natural that we should seek and 
develop common interests. Compared with 
MacDonnell Douglas' world wide component 
supply lines (Figure 14) those of our 
current European partners represent little 
more than a Western seaboard activity.
APPENDIX
VARIABLE WING SWEEP. EARLY RESEARCH WORK 
- TO MRCA
Variable wing sweep research is one 
example of innovation and probably the 
longest programme spanning as it does 
from the early research in 1945 through 
many start, stop projects and studies, 
some across International boundaries, to 
the 1st flight of MRCA in 1974. For the 
research worker, engineer and technologist 
the programme has been both fascinating 
and rewarding and a short survey of this 
work follows. It deals only with the 
work done by Vickers and later BAG Limited 
because of the author's close association 
with it. The historical milestones are:-
1946 Miles M52 manned experimen­ 
tal supersonic aircraft 
prototype stopped.
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1956 to 1949
1949 to 1959
1952
1955
1957
1958
1958
1959
1959/60
1960
1961 
1962-3
1963-4
1964
1963 to 1965
Barnes Wallis Variable 
Geometry (variable sweep and 
variable incidence) studies 
and experimental models 
built.
Unmanned Wild Goose and 
Swallow flying, detail mech­ 
anical and bearing test 
work, general operational 
aircraft studies and some 
missile studies - all em­ 
bracing variable wing sweep.
Manned variant of Wild Goose 
(J.C.9) stopped at advanced 
state of build.
Variable sweep design to OR 
330 (Recce Bomber) studied.
U.K. Defence White Paper 
against manned aircraft.
Vickers and Ministry of 
Aviation team visit NASA 
Langley for discussion with 
the late Mr. John Stack and 
team.
Feasibility studies to OR 
339 (TSR2).
V.S. Research moved from 
R&D (Barnes Wallis) to 
Vickers Design Office.
Joint NASA, MOA and Vickers
studies.
Feasibility study ER 206 to
Naval/Airstaff requirement
OR 346.
Vickers merges with British 
Aircraft Corporation.
NATO BMR 3 Proposal.
Studies to OR 356 and AW 406 
RAF/RN requirements. 
Studies to convert fixed 
wing aircraft into V.S. 
experimental flying test 
beds.
Detail design of V.S. exper­ 
imental aircraft to an 
operational configuration 
(Type 593).
Decision not to proceed with 
the experimental aircraft 
approach. Work transferred 
from B.A.C. (Weybridge) to 
BAG (Preston) Division.
Variable wing sweep trainer/ 
light tactical aircraft 
studies.
1965 to 1967 Anglo-French V.S. project 
(A.F.V.G.).
1967 France abandons project.
1967 to 1968 U.K. holding operation 
(UKVG).
1968
1974
A.C.A. - 
begins.
M.R.C.A. work
M.R.C.A. 1st flight.
Toward the end of the 1939-45 War 
Barnes Wallis (now Sir Barnes Wallis) 
became involved in research toward super­ 
sonic flight. Initially this work was 
associated with the Miles M52 a research 
vehicle with straight thin wings of low 
aspect ratio. Unmanned models, rocket 
propelled were dropped from a Mosquito 
aircraft in 1947 and reached M=1.02. He 
soon realised the configuration clash 
between subsonic long range and low speed 
requirements demanding high aspect ratios 
and the ideal swept back low aspect ratio 
needs of the supersonic wing and that the 
variable configuration solution (the 
Polymorph) should be his design aim.
First studies were around a con­ 
figuration called Wild Goose (Figure 15) 
a solution where the tailplane was dis­ 
pensed with longitudinal stability re­ 
sulting from the interaction of the body 
pitching moment and small changes in wing 
sweep. Roll control was by use of asymm­ 
etric wing sweep. Many novel wing sus­ 
pension schemes were evolved, some in­ 
cluding an independent variable incidence 
control (Figure 16) . The final solution 
for this phase was a single pivot mounted 
inside and using the structural depth 
afforded by a 3:2 ratio elliptical section 
fuselage, the axis of the pin being set at 
an angle to give the appropriate re­ 
quirements of incidence and dihedral over 
the sweep range. To achieve the necessary 
target L/D of 9-10 required laminar flow 
over a large part of the body length and 
the configuration was abandoned for this 
reason.
The next configuration "Swallow" 
(Figure 17) was in effect the Wild Goose 
fuselage flattened to a delta form with 
wings appended at the base. Theoretical 
and model work gave hope that an L/D of 
about the right order was feasible. The 
configuration demanded a different 
approach to wing suspension as the pivot 
point would be contained within the wing 
geometry (Figure 18). The solution 
chosen used a spherical pivot bearing and 
arcuate wing root pads providing a three 
point non-redundant suspension with a 
large structural arm to reduce bearing 
loads. Space does not allow detail dis­ 
cussion on this or the Wild Goose sus-
5-31
pension but a great deal of bearing 
development, types of sealing and arrange­ 
ments for carrying services round the 
pivot, was done.
Pilot—less models, weighing about 
100O Ibs. and. 30 ft. span were flown, 
propelled by a cold motor rocket - 
hydrogen peroxide expelled 'under pressure 
through a catalyst. A similar though 
more powerful rocket system propelled a 
launching trolly. The models "took off 11 
when the trolly reached launching speed 
and, the lift generated by the wings ex­ 
ceeded the weight* as measured by an auto­ 
matic spring release* f'he aircraft flew 
a circular course *piloted" from a central 
position some mile or so from the aircraft 
at all times* Part of the control, the 
roll signal was handed over to another 
pilot located at the far end of a con­ 
ventional runway* This second Poll Pilot 
"banked" the aircraft into a level 
position over the runway 'and, when ready 
signalled the central and now Pitch Pilot 
to land the machine. Later Swallow .Models' 
took off and landed from a runway in the 
conventional manner 'using its own under­ 
carriage*
This phase of the work proved that 
these rather unorthodox configurations 
could be flown quite easily but a manned 
version of the Wild Goose was in an ad­ 
vanced state of build when it was stopped 
in favour of the pilot-less experiments. 
A lot was learnt about mechanisms, auto­ 
matic pilots, Ingenious methods of remote 
flying but perhaps less than hoped about 
the design, characteristics for an 
operational aircraft.
The U.K. Government shared the cost 
of this work with Vickers, but when their 
support ceased in 1958 Vickers sought to 
continue with the work through the Mutual 
Aid Weapons Development Programme 
(M.W.D.P.) which was already assisting the 
funding of the Bristol Siddeley Pegasus 
deflecting jet engine. This led to a 
team visiting NASA Langley in November, 
1958. Work at Vickers was transferred 
from the Barnes Wallis research area to 
the military project office at Weybridge 
(soon to become BAG) under the overall 
control of Sir George Edwards and for a 
year or so there was a joint study with 
NASA. One of the arrangements that 
emerged is shown on (Figure 19) .
Many studies were made to British 
requirements to a joint Naval and Air 
Staff target when Variable Sweep was 
compared with other fixed wing arrange­ 
ments. Later a project was tendered to 
the NATO BMR 3 requirement, (Figure 20) 
which also had a vertical lift capability. 
This requirement fell down because of 
European local Nationalisms.
A number of proposals were made to 
get flying experience by converting 
existing aircraft into variable sweep ex­ 
perimental machines, the most notable of 
these being a modification to an English 
Electric Lightning aircraft. It would 
have improved the Lightning's airfield 
performance but little else but its 
purpose was intended for practical ex­ 
perience and not Type improvement.
In parallel an entirely new ex­ 
perimental aircraft was projected (Figure 
21) (Type 583) having a configuration and 
envelope size to allow development to an 
operational role and the design and 
programme went into considerable detail. 
Although the relative cost of this and 
the Lightning modification was in the 
order of 10:1 the more expensive model 
was chosen by M.O.A. to be the more 
valuable as a research tool, but it was 
expensive and not proceeded with. Thus 
the practical experience of mechanisms 
and structures which could have been 
provided by the cheaper Lightning modifi­ 
cation, was lost. The official reason 
for not proceeding with an experimental 
aircraft was that it was considered that 
enough wind tunnel, structural and 
mechanical test work and analysis was 
done to give confidence that a Variable 
Sweep operational aeroplane was practical 
when the operational need arose.
Many operational studies followed, 
the work having now been transferred to 
the Preston Division of the British 
Aircraft Corporation (earlier English 
Electric and producers of Canberra and 
Lightning aircraft) . International 
collaborative activity started again with 
a joint Anglo/French requirement (AFVG) 
which stopped after about two years of 
work when the French withdrew; later to 
embark on their own unilateral V.S. 
Mirage project. Following a holding 
operation initial work began on an 
Advanced Combat Aircraft (ACA) involving 
UK, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands 
and Canada (Figure 22) .
Figure 23 shows the International 
Family Tree leading to MRCA and the 
International Panavia Company, by which 
time Belgium, Netherlands and Canada had 
dropped out of the project.
It might appear from what has been 
written here that Variable Wing Sweep has 
been the driving force behind the MRCA 
design. It is the other way round 
Variable Wing Sweep is a necessary 
feature to enable the requirements of the 
interested Air Staffs to be met and 
before confirming this configuration for 
the design comparative fixed wing studies 
were made (Figure 24) there are right and 
proper reasons and opportunities for
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adopting this feature.
Such is the ancestry of this latest 
European Military project which is now 
well into its development phase. Although 
space does not allow comment acknowledge­ 
ment must be made of other UK work part­ 
icularly at Folland the work by 
Messerschmitt (Me P1101), Bell and Grumman 
in U.S. around 1950, of the US F-lll and 
the U.S. supersonic airliner work.
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Figure 15. "Wild Goose" 
Launching Trolley
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Figure 17. "Swallow" - Unmanned Flight
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Figure 19. N.A.S.A. - Anglo 
U.S. Study Configuration
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Figure 21. Research Aircraft - 
Type 583 Study
Figure 22. M.R.C.A.
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